Efeitos do sistema de comércio mundial moderno inicial

Early Modern Ports, 1500 & # 8211; 1750.
Publicado Erschienen: 2010-12-03 & # 160; & # 160;
Os portos são os veículos por excelência para as transações. Desde tempos imemoriais, os portos foram portas para a troca de bens, pessoas e idéias. Essas trocas determinaram a relevância que certas áreas alcançaram na história mundial ao enquadrar contatos globais além dos estreitos muros urbanos de uma determinada cidade. Mesmo que os portos tardios da Medieval e do Renascimento se situassem na bacia do Mediterrâneo, a expansão européia no exterior e a competição local moviam a preeminência dos portos europeus para o eixo do Atlântico, onde as cidades do noroeste da Europa assumiram a maior parte dos aspectos econômicos, sociais, políticos e culturais centrais. papel das grandes metrópoles, restantes pontos nodais importantes para interações globais até hoje.
Inhaltsverzeichnis Índice.
Introdução.
Desde tempos imemoriais, o mar tem sido um elo entre os estados, e os portos têm conectado pontes entre diferentes povos e culturas. 1 Os portos não só aproximavam as comunidades, mas também tinham funções específicas inerentes à sua posição como ligações ao mar e como conexões entre diferentes poderes políticos e civilizações. Este artigo começará com a definição de três conceitos centrais ao considerar os portos como objetos de estudo histórico, nomeadamente "portos", "hinterlands" e "regiões". Esses três conceitos desenham o quadro dentro do qual os historiadores até agora consideraram os portos, sua influência e seu papel na história.
O artigo prosseguirá explorando as diferentes portas de funções adquiridas na história e como essas funções influenciaram o desenvolvimento histórico de cada porta individual. Prestará especial atenção às funções econômicas, políticas, sociais e culturais que assumiram um bom número de portos e que influenciaram o resultado de seu sucesso ou fracasso como jogadores globais.
Portos, hinterlands e regiões.
Ao estudar o papel e a influência dos portos na história, é importante entender o que os historiadores significam quando escrevem sobre os portos. O conceito do primeiro porto moderno tem suas raízes na tradição urbana medieval. O título de "porto" foi geralmente dado a cidades cuja atividade principal era o comércio, sendo localizado nas margens de um grande rio ou no mar. Quando o papel do comércio e das atividades de mercado se tornaram importantes o suficiente para um determinado porto, essas atividades seriam reguladas pelas autoridades urbanas ou pelo governo central (rei).
Durante o início do período moderno, a noção de porto era semelhante. A nível urbano, pode-se distinguir um porto de qualquer outro tipo de cidade, observando a sua composição urbana. Havia três características que marcavam os portos. Em primeiro lugar, os portos tinham portos que eram o centro do movimento de pessoas e produtos. Em segundo lugar, a morfologia urbana dos portos sempre teve edifícios ou espaços particulares que dominaram a cidade, como estaleiros, armazéns, alfândegas, mercados abertos, pousadas e pubs. Finalmente, os portos também podem ser identificados pelos grupos socioeconômicos particulares que abrigaram. Por exemplo, os portos geralmente atraíam um grande número de comerciantes, banqueiros, contadores, lojistas, construtores de navios e estrangeiros. 2.
Mesmo que os portos fossem importantes como estruturas urbanas com uma ligação direta ao mar ou através de estuários dos rios, os primeiros portos modernos, como todas as outras cidades e cidades da época, não podiam sobreviver sem o seu interior. O conceito primário do interior é o de um ambiente rural que imediatamente envolve um porto. Ainda há algum debate sobre esta definição. Os historiadores medievais afirmam que o interior era espaços que cercavam os portos, mas também faziam parte da estrutura urbana porque a cidade tinha direitos de jurisdição sobre eles. Na prática, isso significava que um sistema urbano era composto de um elemento urbano e # 8211; a porta & # 8211; e um elemento rural & # 8211; o interior do país. 3.
Os primeiros historiadores marítimos e urbanos modernos avançaram com sua definição de interior. Eles concordam com os medievalistas que os sertões eram muitas vezes da jurisdição do porto, mas enfatizavam a idéia do crescimento do sertão informal durante o período do início do século XX. Por meio do interior informal, eles significam não apenas a definição claramente jurisdicional dada pelos medievalistas, mas também a medida em que os portos influenciaram o seu espaço circundante e a medida em que esse espaço influenciou os portos. Portanto, para o período do início do século moderno, é preciso olhar para o interior rural imediato (jurisdicionalmente dependente do porto), mas também em um espaço maior que se poderia chamar de regional, que pode incluir áreas de migração e comércio de longa distância e intercâmbios culturais . 4 Alguns argumentam, indo ainda mais longe, que o interior também pode ter um caráter transcontinental, especialmente durante uma época em que os portos europeus se aventuraram em empresas estrangeiras. 5.
A definição de hinterlands modernos precoce e sua relação simbiótica com os portos europeus foi primordial para determinar a posição que cada porto assumiu em uma região específica e, portanto, sua projeção para além dessa região, muitas vezes nas arenas internacionais e globais. Esta abordagem da definição de hinterlands indica uma evolução da Idade Média para o período inicial moderno em que os portos e o interior se tornaram menos vinculados jurisdicionalmente e mais ligados de forma informal.
Ao considerar o desenvolvimento e o local dos portos em um contexto histórico mais amplo, contamos com dois quadros teóricos básicos: a teoria do lugar central e a teoria da rede. A teoria do lugar central identifica as cidades como centros de consumo e comercialização de produtos provenientes da paisagem circundante. 6 Essas cidades não só funcionariam como mercados comerciais, mas também como prestadores de serviços. A variedade e a eficiência desses serviços dependeriam principalmente do tamanho das cidades. A teoria afirma que as pequenas cidades com vínculos estreitos com a área agrícola circundante são colocadas abaixo do nível de cidades maiores, proporcionando serviços mais extensos, que por sua vez seriam a base para o desenvolvimento de cidades regionais. A eficiência e a diversidade das cidades regionais de serviços disponibilizadas superariam o nível dos serviços que outras cidades tinham para oferecer. 7.
O sistema hierárquico construído pela teoria do lugar central apresenta um problema. Se alguém subdividir os serviços prestados por pequenas cidades, cidades maiores e centros regionais, pode-se ver que as hierarquias locais dependem do tipo de serviços prestados. Por exemplo, uma pequena cidade poderia ter oferecido um mercado agrícola mais importante do que uma cidade grande, mas geralmente não forneceu serviços financeiros, como cidades maiores ou cidades regionais. Na análise final, pode-se considerar uma gama de serviços, que consiste em várias hierarquias cada uma dependendo de um serviço específico. Isso também se aplica a fatores econômicos, como capital, trabalho ou mercados, a fatores administrativos, como a aplicação da lei, a administração pública ou a cobrança de impostos, ou mesmo a fatores culturais e disseminação tecnológica.
A teoria do lugar central levanta uma série de dúvidas e duvidas e não pode ser considerada isoladamente. É necessário complementá-lo com outras teorias. Parece que a melhor dessas teorias foi totalmente desenvolvida por Paul M. Hohenberg e Lynn H. Lees. 8 Na sua pesquisa sobre a urbanização da Europa, eles combinam sistematicamente uma teoria da rede com um sistema de local central e, assim, levam um pouco mais o conceito de interação urbana.
Hohenberg e Lees implicam que, em um nível inferior e médio da hierarquia do lugar central, deve haver um certo grau de cooperação entre as cidades e, especificamente, entre os portos. Assim, em vez de aceitar seu papel urbano como resultado de sua posição geográfica na hierarquia, Hohenberg e Lees consideram que cidades e cidades precisam ser analisadas de acordo com sua função. Seguindo os argumentos dos autores, essas funções são definidas não apenas pela geografia, mas também pelas suas ligações a outras áreas urbanas. Isso significa que durante o período inicial do início do século, os portos estavam em melhor posição para fornecer mais serviços, o que significava que eles poderiam assumir a posição mais vantajosa quando se relacionavam com o seu interior e seus parceiros urbanos. Quanto mais eles trouxeram do interior, maiores se tornaram a área sob sua influência formal ou informal, e quanto mais potencial alcançaram para interconexão e interdependência urbana.
Uma das conseqüências da teoria da rede é que as conexões e interdependências urbanas aumentaram com o crescimento da rede de portos interligados. Esses relacionamentos estreitos facilitaram a distribuição de todo tipo de produtos econômicos, sociais e culturais. No início, o intervalo de distribuição incluiu principalmente coisas materiais, como produtos e capital. Mas em breve, as pessoas (migração) e as coisas subjetivas como idéias, desenvolvimento tecnológico e informações viajaram mais rápido e penetraram mais profundamente do que nunca, contribuindo assim para uma complexidade cada vez maior dos sistemas de rede porto / hinterland.
O número crescente de serviços e interações entre os portos e suas contrapartes urbanas nas redes diretas do interior, região, transnacional e transcontinental lhes conferiu uma função vista por muitos como o último sinal do papel globalizador que os portos desempenharam na história, funcionando como gateways. 9 Esse papel de gateway foi especialmente importante ao considerar as diferentes funções que os portos tiveram no período inicial moderno, época em que a maioria das grandes cidades eram portos e a maioria deles estava envolvida, de uma forma ou de outra, no movimento geral de expansão européia no exterior.
No entanto, nem todos os portos modernos iniciais eram grandes e nem todos eram gateways globais. Alguns deles foram forçados a uma posição de "função de janela" social, econômica e cultural por um estado forte que precisa de contato com o mundo exterior, como foi o caso do papel que São Petersburgo assumiu na órbita do Estado russo . 10 Outros, como alguns pequenos portos na Escandinávia, foram usados ​​como bastidores de demarcação de fronteiras territoriais em contextos onde a competição entre estados centrais opostos ameaçava a integridade de um deles, como aconteceu no caso de L & # 246; d & # 246; se na fronteira sueco-norueguesa. 11.
Transações sociais, econômicas e culturais.
Os portos de função assumidos como gateways durante o período inicial moderno podem ser atribuídos ao fato de que eles eram ambientes urbanos onde as transações ocorreram. Essas transações eram numerosas e refletia que as portas de caracteres multifuncionais tinham na época.
A função mais primária e distinta dos portos modernos iniciais foi a transação de mercadorias, comumente designada como comércio, mas que foi além do comércio, crescendo para incluir todas as atividades relacionadas de construção naval, contabilidade e uma ampla gama de serviços, tais como registro notarial, crédito, seguros e, em alguns casos, até mesmo a organização de bolsas especializadas e empresas fretadas. 12.
O sucesso dos primeiros portos modernos alcançados em seu papel de gateways para produtos foi determinado pela sua posição nas redes comerciais de cada porta pertencente. Se alguns, como Veneza, Sevilha, Lisboa ou Cadiz eram principalmente centros de transações intercontinentais, portos como Antuérpia, Amsterdã ou Londres cresciam dos centros regionais para os poderes intercontinentais, tornando-se assim pontes entre as redes comerciais europeias centenárias e o recém-encontrado Atlântico e as rotas asiáticas. 13.
Para a maioria dos portos, a essência do comércio dependia da troca de produtos em mercados mais ou menos livres. Portanto, o conhecimento das lojas de produção, mercados de consumo e comportamento do mercado foi primordial para uma porta próspera. Este conhecimento deu informações sobre técnicas de produção, condições climáticas, credibilidade e moda, um valor próprio, uma vez que os diferentes graus de informação podem funcionar para ou contra determinado porto, dependendo do tempo e da quantidade de informações disponíveis em determinado momento. Portanto, nenhum grande porto internacional foi capaz de fazer bem na transação de produtos se os fluxos de informações não fossem pelo menos tão eficientes. 14 A principal fonte de informação durante o período inicial moderno foi boca a boca (principalmente através de contato pessoal ou cartas pessoais) e, em alguns lugares, a imprensa, embora o último tenha significado quase insignificante. A informação viajou com as pessoas, e por isso os portos estavam em vantagem quando comparados com outros tipos de cidades. Uma vez que as pessoas freqüentemente viajavam com produtos, e como os portos sempre eram um ambiente atraente para os imigrantes devido à ampla disponibilidade de trabalho dentro da cidade, ou a oportunidade de encontrar transporte para outro lugar, as notícias chegaram rapidamente à maioria dos portos.
Se a maioria dos fluxos de informação que chegam aos primeiros portos europeus modernos eram de natureza prática, muitas vezes ligadas ao comércio (notícias de escassez, preços, clima, guerras, embargos, etc.), também havia um fluxo de transações intelectuais que também pode ser classificar como informação. A troca de conhecimento escrito através da importação / exportação de livros, panfletos e materiais escritos religiosos posicionou os portos na vanguarda das trocas intelectuais. Portanto, não é surpreendente que a maioria dos portos tenham sido ambientes mais ou menos tolerantes para a troca de idéias religiosas pouco ortodoxas, conceitos políticos ou desenvolvimentos tecnológicos.
O crescimento da quantidade de informações práticas e intelectuais nas redes europeias dos portos modernos iniciais enfatiza a importância que as transações humanas ganharam em muitas dessas cidades. A disseminação de manufaturas, serviços e atividades militares ligadas ao comércio impôs uma demanda permanente por uma força de trabalho fluida e flexível na maioria dos sistemas portuários europeus. Muitas vezes, oferecendo uma ampla gama de atividades especializadas, os portos eram conhecidos por lugares onde se poderia ganhar um salário relativamente maior do que em outras cidades e onde a disponibilidade permanente de trabalho era constante. Essas circunstâncias atraíram um número muito significativo de imigrantes provenientes do interior rural, da região ou mesmo do interior informal no exterior. 15.
A migração rural ou urbana de perto ou distante influenciou muito a composição social da maioria dos portos, tornando-os ambientes extraordinários de interação social, trocas religiosas e transações culturais. Esse foi certamente o caso dos portos europeus que receberam uma parcela justa de escravos importados da Costa Oeste ou do Norte da África e africanos livres, como foi o caso de Lisboa, Livorno, Liverpool ou Marselha.
Se os escravos foram forçados a migrar contra a vontade deles, outros grupos deixaram suas cidades de origem devido à perseguição religiosa. Esse foi o caso dos novos cristãos ibéricos, muitas vezes forçados ao exílio pelas ações da Inquisição, ou os huguenotes, forçados a fugir de suas cidades de origem para evitar a exclusão religiosa. Um número considerável desses migrantes fugiram para os portos do noroeste da Europa como Amberes, Amsterdã, Hamburgo ou Londres, onde contribuíram significativamente para a vida econômica, social e cultural desses portos há mais de 350 anos.
Infelizmente, nem todos os migrantes modernos primitivos foram bem-sucedidos e sua sobrevivência no porto de destino foi muitas vezes dificultada pela instabilidade dos mercados de trabalho ou por crises econômicas. Muitas vezes, os membros mais fracos dos aglomerados urbanos ficaram presas de desafios de sobrevivência assustadores. Esse era o caso de todos os membros da sociedade que, por algum motivo, não tinham lugar no quadro familiar tradicional, como era o caso de homens e mulheres solteiros, viúvos e viúvas ou órfãos. Entre esses grupos, os jovens e as mulheres eram aqueles em situação de maior precariedade, já que sua presença em grandes metrópoles anônimas era geralmente percebida como criminosa ou moralmente questionável na melhor das hipóteses. Muitas vezes impulsionados pela pobreza ou pela necessidade de renda devido à exclusão das instituições de caridade da época, alguns foram forçados a roubar, escavar ou prostituir.
Embora a prostituição tenha sido uma característica comum dos portos modernos iniciais, sua percepção parece ter sido enfatizada demais pelos sentimentos dos contemporâneos. Estudos recentes demonstraram que a prostituição era muitas vezes uma atividade sazonal para a maioria das mulheres casadas (e não solteiras) e era usada para complementar suas escassas rendimentos familiares. Essas mulheres muitas vezes foram forçadas a assumir a posição de chefes de suas famílias devido às profissões de seus maridos como marinheiros ou soldados. Quando seus homens se embarcaram em suas viagens ou campanhas, a maioria das mulheres ficou com parte dos salários dos homens (geralmente uma parte muito pequena) e uma família a manter. Durante a primavera eo verão, eles conseguiram encontrar pequenos trabalhos no porto ou como fornecedores de logística para os navios, embora o outono e o inverno tenham sido difíceis de encontrar um emprego. Aqueles que não podiam candidatar-se à caridade foram forçados a prostituir-se. Esse foi certamente o caso na maioria dos portos holandeses e ingleses nos séculos XVII e XVIII. 16.
Com o grande fluxo de informações práticas e intelectuais e a tolerância que era necessária para manter a maior parte desse fluxo de informações, os portos tornaram-se paraísos seguros para estudiosos e intelectuais regionais, estrangeiros, clérigos e comerciantes, obrigados a deixar suas terras nativas por causa de suas crença religiosa, científica ou política. Com as pessoas sendo forçadas a viver juntos em espaços urbanos frequentemente pequenos, a tolerância religiosa, cultural e social tornou-se primordial para a sobrevivência dos portos como identidades sociais, especialmente em questões relativas à aplicação da lei e da ordem.
A superlotação urbana foi uma das muitas conseqüências dos portos de recurso para muitos imigrantes. Embora melhor equipados do que outros tipos de cidades para sobreviver a problemas de saúde pública resultantes da coexistência de grandes populações, muitas vezes dentro de muros medievais tradicionais, os portos foram obrigados a se expandir para os arredores, a criar regulamentos de saúde pública para evitar a contaminação (por exemplo , excluindo as indústrias poluentes dos muros da cidade), para promover o alívio pobre (mais frequentemente do que não através das organizações religiosas e sociais, como igrejas e guildas) e, às vezes, até regular o acesso das pessoas através dos portões ou o porto da cidade, incentivando, como resultado, o desenvolvimento de um "espírito de cidade" através da separação de "cidadãos" de "não-cidadãos", uma divisão não desenhada por linhas socioeconômicas, mas simplesmente pela definição territorial de quem habitou a cidade e por quanto tempo. 17.
Infelizmente, para muitos, os regulamentos de saúde pública e o acesso controlado às cidades não salvaram os portos medievais, modernos adiantados e até modernos de serem vítimas de epidemias graves que ameaçavam não só o sustento de suas populações, mas também ameaçavam sua existência per se. Embora o superlotação tenha imposto sérios desafios aos conselhos municipais, para os portos a ameaça mais perigosa veio do mar. A chegada contínua de navios estrangeiros, geralmente sazonalmente, levou a períodos agitados ao redor das docas, onde a vigilância às vezes foi reduzida, muito fraca ou inexistente. Isso permitiu a entrada de tripulações doentes e produtos contaminados, muitas vezes infectados no porto de partida ou no mar. Embora às vezes inconscientes de seu status de saúde, navios estrangeiros chamados em portos saudáveis, onde permaneceram o tempo que era necessário para suas transações comerciais, deixando um rastro de doença e pestilência que se espalharia rapidamente por toda a cidade, auxiliada pelo superlotação condições dentro do ambiente urbano. 18.
Havia pouco o que os habitantes ou conselhos municipais poderiam fazer para evitar as consequências do que poderia ser chamado de transações negativas. No entanto, sempre houve alguns recursos que poderiam ser aproveitados ou algumas medidas que poderiam ser tomadas. Para as pessoas que viviam nas cidades, a escolha óbvia quando a praga ou a doença estourou era abandonar a cidade por um lugar no campo, muitas vezes dentro da jurisdição da cidade, isto é, no interior tradicional. No entanto, esta era uma possibilidade apenas para aqueles ricos ou saudáveis ​​o suficiente para poder abandonar a cidade e deixar suas atividades para trás sem pôr em perigo sua sobrevivência diária. Por outro lado, abandonar a cidade para o campo também era apenas uma opção, desde que o campo fosse imune à propagação da doença. Assim que os moradores urbanos começaram a inundar as áreas rurais, a doença se espalhou tão rapidamente como se ainda estivesse confinada dentro das muralhas da cidade, deixando as áreas saudáveis ​​para o refúgio mais longe. Embora os indivíduos bem-sucedidos tivessem a opção de sair, os habitantes menos ricos não conseguiram fazê-lo. Para eles, os conselhos da cidade só tinham a opção de disponibilizar alimentos e água através da regulamentação e obrigar as instituições religiosas a enterrar os mortos o mais rápido possível.
A fim de evitar o caos, as quebras e perdas econômicas provocadas pela propagação da doença nos portos, muitos municípios da Europa Ocidental aplicaram um conjunto de leis romanas como medidas regulatórias no caso de navios atingidos pela praga ou provenientes de áreas onde a peste foi relatada. De acordo com este conjunto de leis, os conselhos municipais tinham o direito de discriminar navios e tripulações que vieram de certos portos ou estavam envolvidos em certas áreas geográficas. Para aqueles, o porto foi submetido a um embargo temporário que só foi levantado quando o perigo havia decorrido (ou porque não havia casos de doença a bordo, a quarentena tinha sido bem sucedida ou o navio acabara de sair). Embora originalmente usado como uma das poucas armas contra a propagação da doença, os embargos de saúde costumavam ser usados ​​com propósitos políticos para provocar o desaparecimento de competidores econômicos. Um bom exemplo da forma como esse mecanismo foi abusado foram os embargos intermináveis ​​impostos por Gênova em navios venezianos e vice-versa, com cada cidade tentando estimular seus próprios empreendimentos comerciais no Mediterrâneo Oriental em detrimento do outro.
O forte desenvolvimento de uma idéia de cidadania aliada ao poder econômico trazido pelas atividades de comércio e manufatura fazia a maioria dos portos europeus locais de tolerância intelectual e autonomia política. Apesar de sobreviver no contexto dos crescentes estados centralizados, os primeiros portos europeus modernos conseguiram negociar sua posição autônoma dentro do espectro político, assumindo a centralidade política e tornando-se capitais, ou re-negociando cartas de privilégios medievais que regulavam as trocas políticas entre as principais poderes (reis) e os habitantes da cidade (muitas vezes representados em conselhos municipais bem organizados em que os elementos relacionados às atividades de comércio e fabricação se assentaram lado a lado com todos os outros representantes da ordem social urbana). 19.
A funcionalidade-chave dos portos europeus em geral foi sua capacidade de criar, desenvolver e se destacar em uma ampla gama de transações, apenas possível devido às múltiplas funções de gateway que os bancos podiam assumir na rede urbana européia na época.
Da cidade local ao jogador global.
Mesmo que a maioria dos portos modernos primitivos fossem ambientes urbanos ricos, nem todos obtiveram proeminência semelhante. O crescimento eo sucesso dos portos parecem ter seguido um caminho claro de desenvolvimento, com duas origens possíveis e um único resultado. Os primeiros portos modernos desenvolveram-se em grandes metrópoles, ganhando impulso ao se aventurarem fora de seus sistemas tradicionais de interiores informais ou ganhando um jogo de competição contra seus pares a nível local e regional.
Portos como Veneza, Sevilha, Lisboa e Cadiz devem seu status conhecido ao papel proeminente que desempenharam dentro de um movimento mais amplo e mais geral de expansão no exterior pelos estados centrais a que pertenciam (no caso de Veneza, a própria cidade). A expansão veneziana no Mediterrâneo é, em tudo, comparável às expansões portuguesas e espanholas nos Oceanos Atlântico e Índico. O facto de Veneza, Sevilha, Lisboa e Cadiz terem podido participar do intercâmbio de novidades (produtos, cultura, informação, conhecimento) adquiridos em regiões que ultrapassaram os seus tradicionais sistemas de interior informal tornaram-se centros fundamentais do mundo conhecido antes do meio Século XVI. 20.
Mesmo que a expansão veneziana, portuguesa e espanhola no exterior pareça ter trazido grandes ganhos a portos específicos, esses portos foram centros pobres de redes regionais, especialmente quando comparados com outros portos contemporâneos do norte da Europa. A situação geográfica relativamente isolada de todos esses portos em expansão tornou-os dependentes da empresa de expansão. Bem ciente de que suas fortunas dependeram do sucesso da expansão e conquista no exterior, Veneza, Lisboa, Sevilha e Cádiz foram propensas a apoiar todas as tentativas possíveis do estado central para aumentar sua influência no exterior, tornando-se cada vez mais peões nas trocas políticas e diplomáticas do tempo.
A falta de um meio ambiente regional e trans-regional constante e forte forçou o Renascimento e os primeiros grandes portos modernos iniciais a buscar parceiros no contexto europeu para sobreviver como centros de transações e trocas. 21 A seleção de parceiros envolveu não tanto os portos de morfologia semelhantes, como os portos regionais mais pequenos com boas conexões do interior e regionais, todos no norte da Europa. Começando com Antuérpia, Amsterdã, Hamburgo, os portos do Báltico e Londres, todos eles principalmente portos regionais com boas ligações com seus sertões e regiões, o processo de seleção para parcerias seguiu as ondas de complexidades políticas e acordos diplomáticos.
Para ter uma chance de se envolver com um importante parceiro do sul da Europa, a maioria dos portos do norte da Europa teve que lutar contra seus concorrentes regionais, a fim de prevalecer como os principais candidatos à parceria. Este foi certamente o caso quando Antuérpia ultrapassou Bruges e Amsterdã deixaram atrás de Middleburg, Flushing, Hoorn ou Enkhuizen. Hamburgo conseguiu vencer a maioria dos rivais do norte da Alemanha e do Báltico, e Londres tornou-se o principal porto das ilhas britânicas.
Esta concorrência regional, ao contrário dos métodos de expansão dos portos do sul da Europa, foi impulsionada por oferecer vantagens aos parceiros para que possam realizar transações com um ponto de partida vantajoso. Um dos mecanismos utilizados pelos portos do norte da Europa para atrair os intercâmbios com parceiros do sul da Europa criou um conjunto de privilégios para produtos, pessoas e idéias importados desses parceiros, seja pelo estabelecimento de fábricas (como foi o caso da fábrica portuguesa de Antuérpia) ou através da emissão de cartas de privilégios (como foi o caso dos comerciantes venezianos em Londres). 22 Estes mecanismos ajudaram os portos do norte da Europa a se tornarem os centros de práticas monopolistas, cujo principal objetivo era controlar as redes de redistribuição (formais e informais) de produtos, pessoas e idéias.
Este movimento claro da centralidade portuária do Sul (Mediterrâneo) para o complexo europeu do Norte (principalmente Atlântico) foi bem documentado e explorado por Fernand Braudel (1902, 8211, 1985) e outros. 23 Eles argumentam que houve uma clara mudança do Mediterrâneo para o eixo do Atlântico Norte da Europa que deixou a maioria dos portos pioneiros da expansão européia no exterior como parceiros subterrâneos periféricos para os grandes portos do Norte que conseguiram combinar com sucesso uma centralidade intercontinental de redes informais com proeminência regional e hinterland num contexto de forte concorrência regional.
A reatribuição da centralidade portuária do Mediterrâneo para o eixo atlântico ainda teve consequências que ultrapassaram a importância dos portos como portas de entrada. Esta mudança significou que a importação de produtos, pessoas, idéias e modas se movia para o norte, criando o desenvolvimento de um novo conjunto de valores econômicos, sociais e culturais auxiliados, como Max Weber (1864 & # 8211; 1920) argumentaria, pela divisão religiosa iniciado pela Reforma e Contra-Reforma. 24 Esta divisão geral no sistema portuário europeu iniciado no século 16 deve ser responsabilizada por o que muitos consideram a raiz da "pequena divergência" (e alguns até chamam de "atraso") entre os países do Sul e do Norte da Europa ainda por ser sentiu-se na União Européia hoje em dia. 25.
Conclusões.
Os portos eram elementos urbanos importantes no mapa da Europa moderna adiantada. Eles foram as cidades mais bem sucedidas da época, alcançando esse status, envolvendo toda uma série de transações econômicas, sociais e culturais que marcaram sua funcionalidade em uma determinada região. Embora os portos mais importantes durante o período do Renascimento e o século XVI fossem principalmente mono-funcionais, tirando a maior parte de sua proeminência de sua participação na expansão do estado central no exterior, os portos dos séculos XVI, XVII e XVIII eram grandes acessos para produtos, pessoas e idéias que foram trocadas em todo o mundo.
A importância dos gateways globais como Amsterdã ou Londres pode ser atribuída à sua capacidade de aliar um papel regional com uma transcontinental, o que lhes deu a capacidade de se destacar como nós focais dentro dos sistemas do interior, redes regionais e trocas intercontinentais. Estas metrópoles foram o motor por trás de uma mudança geral do Mediterrâneo para o eixo atlântico, pelo qual a Europa do Norte da Europa adquiriu um desenvolvimento social, político, econômico, cultural e religioso diferente do do sul da Europa, criando assim uma divisão até hoje.
C & # 225; tia Antunes, Leiden.
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by Cátia Antunes Antunes, Cátia : Early Modern Ports, 1500–1750 , in: Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO), hg. vom Leibniz - Institut für Europäische Geschichte (IEG), Mainz European History Online (EGO), published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2010-12-03 . URL: ieg-ego. eu/ antunesc-2010 - en URN: urn:nbn:de:0159-2010102547 [JJJJ-MM-TT] [YYYY-MM-DD] .
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Effects of the early modern global trade system

No other era is as easy to summarize as the EARLY MODERN (1450-1750) era. This is the era the Europeans "wake-up", expand, and build empires. I'm not talking about Charlemagne here. I'm talking about the British Empire. I'm talking about the Dutch East India Trading Company. I'm talking about the Spanish Empire. This is a new Europe. This isn't Marco Polo. These Europeans will come to your land and stay there. They will take over most of the world in this era (if not, in the next). Beyond the Maritime empires (and the effect of their establishment), many huge land empires emerged (most notably the Islamic Mughal and Ottoman Empires. Of course, China is important. It always is. So, here is the Early Modern Period.
The above map was created using the geographic references from this era in the AP World History curriculum. Every geographic reference for this unit appears on this map.
The interconnection of the Eastern and Western hemispheres made possible by transoceanic voyaging marked a key transformation of this period. Technological innovations helped to make transoceanic connections possible. Changing patterns of long-distance trade included the global circulation of some commodities and the formation of new regional markets and financial centers. Increased trans-regional and global trade networks facilitated the spread of religion and other elements of culture as well as the migration of large numbers of people. Germs carried to the Americas ravaged the indigenous peoples, while the global exchange of crops and animals altered agriculture, diets, and populations around the planet.
I. Existing regional patterns of trade intensified in the context of the new global circulation of goods.
A. The intensification of trade brought prosperity and economic disruption to the mercnahts and goverenments in the trading region of the Indian OCean, Mediterranean, the Sahara, and overland Eurasia.
II. European technological developments in cartography and navigation built on previous knowledge developed in the Classical, Islamic, and Asian worlds.
A. The developments included the production of new tools, innovations in ship designs, and an improved understanding of global wind and current patterns--all of which made transoceanic travel and trade possible.
IV. The new global circulation of goods was facilitated by royal chartered European monopoly companies and the flow of silver from the Spanish colonies in the Amerias to purchase Asian goods for the Atlantic markets. Regional markets continued to flourish in Afro-Eurasia by using established commercial practices and new transoceanic shipping services developed by European Merchants.
A. European merchants’ role in Asian trade was characterized mostly by transporting goods from one Asian country to another market in Asia or the Indian Ocean region.
B. Commercialization and the creation of a global economy were intimately connected to new global circulation of silver from the Americas. (SEE CRASH COURSE BELOW)
(John Green explores how Spain went from being a middling European power to one of the most powerful empires on Earth, thanks to their plunder ((silver)) of the New World in the 16th and 17th centuries.)
C. Mercantilist policies and practices were used by European rulers to expand and control their economies and claim overseas territories, and joint-stock companies, influenced by these mercantilist principles, were used by rulers and merchants to finance exploration and compete against one another in global trade.
V. The new connections between the Eastern and Western hemispheres resulted in the Columbian Exchange.
A. European colonization of the Americas led to the spread of diseases — including smallpox, measles, and influenza — that were endemic in the Eastern Hemisphere among Amerindian populations and the unintentional transfer of disease vectors, including mosquitoes and rats.
B. American foods (potatoes, maize, manioc) became staple crops in various parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Cash crops (sugar, tobacco) were grown primarily on plantations with coerced labor and were exported mostly to Europe and the Middle East in this period.
C. Afro-Eurasian fruit trees, grains, sugar, and domesticated animals (horses, cattle, pigs) were brought by Europeans to the Americas, while other foods were brought by African slaves ( okra, rice )
E. European colonization and the introduction of European agriculture and settlements practices in the Americas often affected the physical environment through deforestation and soil depletion.
VI. The increase in interactions between newly connected hemispheres and intensification of connections within hemispheres expanded the spread and reform of existing religions and contributed to both religious conflicts and the creation of syncretic belief systems and practices.
VII. As merchants' profits increased and governments collected more taxes, funding for the visual and performing arts, even for popular audiences, increased along with an expansion of literacy and increased focus on innovation and scientific inquiry.
(CLICK THIS LINK TO GO TO THE VIRGINIA SOL PAGE DEVOTED TO THE RENAISSANCE)
Although the world’s productive systems continued to be heavily centered on agricultural production throughout this period, major changes occurred in agricultural labor, the systems and locations of manufacturing, gender and social structures, and environmental processes. A surge in agricultural productivity resulted from new methods in crop and field rotation and the introduction of new crops. Economic growth also depended on new forms of manufacturing and new commercial patterns, especially in long-distance trade. Political and economic centers within regions shifted, and merchants’ social status tended to rise in various states. Demographic growth — even in areas such as the Americas, where disease had ravaged the population — was restored by the eighteenth century and surged in many regions, especially with the introduction of American food crops throughout the Eastern Hemisphere. The Columbian Exchange led to new ways of humans interacting with their environments. New forms of coerced and semi-coerced labor emerged in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, and affected ethnic and racial classifications and gender roles.
I. Beginning in the 14th Century, there was a decrease in mean temperatures, often referred to as the Little Ice Age, around the world that lasted until the 19th century, contributing to changes in agricultural practices and the contraction of settlement in parts of the Northern Hemisphere.
II. Traditional peasant agriculture increased and changed, plantations expanded, and demand for labor increased. These changes both fed and responded to growing global demand for raw materials and finished products.
B. Slavery in Africa continued both the traditional incorporation of mainly female slaves into households AND the export of slaves to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
C. The growth of the plantation economy increased the demand for slaves in the Americas.
The Atlantic Slave Trade.
D. Colonial economies in the Americas depended on a range of coerced labor.
III. As new social and political elites changed, they also restructured new ethnic, racial, and gender hierarchies.
A. Both imperial conquests and widening global economic opportunities contributed to the formation of new political and economic elites.
B. The power of existing political and economic elites (Zamindars in the Mughal Empire, Nobility in Europe, Daimyo in Japan) fluctuated as they confronted new challenges to their ability to affect the policies of the increasingly powerful monarchs and leaders.
C. Some notable gender and family restructuring (The dependence of European men on Southeast Asian women for conducting trade, smaller family size in Europe) occurred, including the demographic changes in Africa that resulted from the slave trades.
Empires expanded and conquered new peoples around the world, but they often had difficulties incorporating culturally, ethnically, and religiously diverse subjects, and administrating widely dispersed territories. Agents of the European powers moved into existing trade networks around the world. In Africa and the greater Indian Ocean, nascent European empires consisted mainly of interconnected trading posts and enclaves. In the Americas, European empires moved more quickly to settlement and territorial control, responding to local demographic and commercial conditions. Moreover, the creation of European empires in the Americas quickly fostered a new Atlantic trade system that included the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Around the world, empires and states of varying sizes pursued strategies of centralization, including more efficient taxation systems that placed strains on peasant producers, sometimes prompting local rebellions. Rulers used public displays of art and architecture to legitimize state power. African states shared certain characteristics with larger Eurasian empires. Changes in African and global trading patterns strengthened some West and Central African states — especially on the coast; this led to the rise of new states and contributed to the decline of states on both the coast and in the interior.
I. Rulers used a variety of methods to legitimize and consolidate their power.
A. Rules continued to use religious ideas, art, and monumental architecture to legitimize their rule:
B. Many states adopted practices to accommodate the different ethnic and religious diversity of their subjects or to utilize the economic, political and military contributions of different ethnic or religious groups.
C. Recruitment and use of bureaucratic elites , as well as the development of military professionals, ( Ottoman devshirme, Chinese examination system, Salaried samarai ) became more common among rulers who wanted to maintain centralized control over their populations and resources.
D. Rulers used tribute collection and tax farming to generate revenue for territorial expansion.
II. Imperial expansion relied on the increased use of gunpowder, cannons, and armed trade to establish large empires in both hemispheres.
A. Europeans established new trading-post empires in Africa and Asia, which proved profitable for the rulers and merchants involved in new global trade networks, but these empires also affected the power of the states in interior West and Central Africa.
Although the AP doesn't specifically mention the Safavid or Tokugawa as Empires, they do show up at other points in the curriculum.
The information that follows is not specifically mentioned by the College Board. However, it will make you a more culturally well-rounded person; assim. you're welcome.
There is nothing more renaissance than Raphael's school of Athens. This is a painting of Classical era figures painted by an Italian during the Renaissance. It's almost redundant. Here's a key to who is who in this painting. The central figures are Plato and Aristotle. My favorite part? Raphael painted himself into the painting! Hes in the red robe in the upper right.
This colorful building looks completely out of place in Moscow, Russia (not exactly Disneyland). Plus, this beautiful building was ordered to be built by a guy named Ivan the Terrible! So, the background may not be what you think. The most common question about this cathedral is, "Didn't they blind the dude that built this so that he could never recreate its beauty?" No one knows for sure but the architect kept designing and building for another 10 years. So, if they did blind him; they did a terrible job.
Maybe the most famous building on earth not named the Pyramids. Built by Shah Jahan as a mausoleum for his wife, Mumtaz Mahal. Mumtaz Mahal died giving birth to her 14th child. It took over 21 years to complete and remains one of the true marvels of architecture on the planet.
Castas (Castes) were paintings that were used in Latin America to delineate between the new groups of people that were being born when Europeans, Africans, and Americans intermarried. The whiter you were, the higher your class in society.
Versailles was originally the hunting lodge for Louis XIII. It was located roughly 12 miles outside of Paris and served as an home away from home for the king. Louis XIV, the absolutist Absolute Monarch ever, decided to build an entire city around it. This was the home of the king for around 100 years until the French Revolution.

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Eu não gosto do novo e-mail. Quero voltar para o meu antigo correio. As instruções para ir às configurações e ir para a parte inferior da página não.
Volte para o e-mail antigo. As instruções para fazê-lo não funcionam.
quando é o prêmio de escolha adolescente.
Sou um adolescente notável que faz coisas excepcionais para ajudar seus próprios colegas.
Eu preciso entrar em um programa para biseux e lésbicas.
em um programa para lésbicas bisexuais.
em pothigai t. v. as taxas de vegitales vendidas no mercado o item de pudalangai é mostrado programe peergangai por alguns dias e para karunaik.
no podigai t. v no programa da manhã das taxas de mercado de vegetais, eles exibem o vegetal errado para pudalangai mostram peergangai e para karunaikilangu mostram senaikilangu. pelo que dá o número de telefone do nome dos formadores e o telefone celular pode ser mostrado no topo até que ele termine. Não há nenhum dano para você e útil para os antigos e aqueles que têm interesse podem contatá-los. Espero que você precise corrigir e exibir o número de telefone aqui depois. Você está aqui. T. SOMASUNDARAM, CÉLULA. 9444 925 933.
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Seus resultados de pesquisa para ROCK STAR CRYSTALS em Nova York não incluem nossas lojas como negócios relevantes ou relacionados para uma série de palavras-chave naturais em ponto para nossos negócios. Esta lista inclui Cristais NYC, Crystal Shops NYC, Rock Shops NYC, Mineral Stores NYC, Mineral Shops NYC, Mineral Specimens NYC, Fine Minerals NYC, Crystal Stores NYC, Geodes NYC, CrystaL GIFTS NYC, etc. Nosso site rockstarsrystalsmanhattan geralmente aparece em algum lugar, mas não mostramos na sua lista suspensa de lojas relevantes nesta área. Uma vez que somos uma das maiores e únicas lojas de rock e armazenistas de minerais em Nova York que comercializam exclusivamente cristais, minerais e espécimes minerais. Pensamos que melhoraria a satisfação dos clientes ao pesquisar a YAHOO fornecendo os resultados mais relevantes e efetivos. TENDÊNCIAS PARA A NOSSA AJUDA !
Seus resultados de pesquisa para ROCK STAR CRYSTALS em Nova York não incluem nossas lojas como negócios relevantes ou relacionados para uma série de palavras-chave naturais em ponto para nossos negócios. Esta lista inclui Cristais NYC, Crystal Shops NYC, Rock Shops NYC, Mineral Stores NYC, Mineral Shops NYC, Mineral Specimens NYC, Fine Minerals NYC, Crystal Stores NYC, Geodes NYC, CrystaL GIFTS NYC, etc. Nosso site rockstarsrystalsmanhattan geralmente aparece em algum lugar, mas não mostramos na sua lista suspensa de lojas relevantes nesta área. Uma vez que somos uma das maiores e únicas lojas de rock e armazenistas de minerais em ... mais.
Eu quero mudar o idioma em inglês.
Eu quero mudar o idioma em inglês, então me deixe saber como eu mudo o idioma em todo o email. Quando eu registrei meu e-mail na indonésia e não conheço a língua indonésia.
FAÇA COMPETIR-LHE UM PEQUENO EASER. EU PRECISO A SUA AJUDA E POSSO TENDER-LHE.
sem sugestões, eu aceito o que vier.
No Idea, Im neutra, boa sorte para todos na notícia.
Um resultado de insulto inapropriado foi mostrado por padrão.
Eu estava procurando uma definição de tuppence, a moeda britânica. Recebi um resultado que mencionava os soldados das mulheres. Eu não queria ver esses resultados - certamente não por padrão. Seria preferível, ao pesquisar definições e similares, que os resultados mais gerais (ou seja, não gíria, não slur, inofensivos) sejam mostrados por padrão, e outros apenas se assim desejarem pelo usuário.
Olá Yahoos, 1. Possuo um resumo técnico. 2. Quando eu faço uma pesquisa do Yahoo para o "currículo técnico" e o quot; sem o quot.
2. Quando eu faço uma pesquisa do Yahoo para "resumo de escritor técnico" sem as notas de cotação, há muitos retornos inapropriados, como exemplos, amostras, solicitações de currículos e modelos, etc. E meu site não pode ser encontrado mesmo quando eu definir o resulta em 100!
Dê-me outra oportunidade e eu as listarei para lembrar.
gostaria de votar mais tarde.
Tire seu motor de busca padrão ******** fora do meu site de e-mail.
Eu acho que o título é auto-explicativo.
A interface fede.
O tempo de resposta do Yahoo é terrível. Foi minha página inicial desde que a Internet foi inventada (dias do Netscape Navigator). Vocês têm que melhorar o tempo de resposta. Reduza os vídeos estúpidos e anúncios idiotas. Eu estou cansado disso.
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Economic Relations Between Europe and the World: Dependence and Interdependence.
Published Erschienen : 2012-05-31   
This article sketches the beginnings and central trends in the development of economic ties between Europe and regions outside Europe from 1450 to 1950. The focus is on the increasing diversity and volume of goods exchanged, and the reciprocal enrichment of material cultures between the continents. In this way, the article creates a vivid picture of the emergence of the global market and the beginnings of global competition. It also seeks to identify the central driving forces behind the successive periods of intensification of trade and interaction from the late Middle Ages to the modern period. Finally, this study describes the increasing interconnection of the economic regions of the Orient and the Occident, as well as the interdependence of the two.
Inhaltsverzeichnis Table of Contents.
General Trends in Development.
Trade played a more central role in the mercantilist period of European history from 1500 to 1750 – sometimes referred to as early capitalism or trade capitalism – than in almost any other period. 1 We must begin with the questions: When in human history did the first exchange of goods between Europe and the other four continents of Africa , Asia , America and Australia occur? Where are the origins of what one could describe as on-going exchange, as established economic relations to be found? These questions refer to an even larger global context because the global economic edifice changed fundamentally from "proto-globalization" to globalization. 2 This process was primarily determined by Europe from the 15th to the 20th century. From the 16th century to 1914, trade within Europe at all times constituted the most significant portion of global trade, and the volume of that trade grew disproportionately quickly during the early modern period and into the modern period. 3 National markets became increasingly interconnected, driven by numerous innovations in the areas of infrastructure, transportation, energy supply, and – not least – institutions (rules, constitutions, division of labour, currency standards, etc.). The transition from individual production to mass production and the convergence of prices of goods and materials made transactions considerably easier, thereby accelerating integration.
Starting in the late Middle Ages at the latest and continuing at least into the 19th century, Europe dominated most developments in international trade. From the end of the 19th century, North America began to exert a stronger influence on the global economy. 4 Around the beginning of the 21st century, the Asian states – most notably China – gained influence and the USA became financially dependent on its East Asian creditors, while China seems to become the engine of growth of the current century.
Europe Becomes Increasingly Central from the Late Middle Ages.
In the early part of the last millennium, population movement and the cultivation of new territories increased as a result of the crusades and the eastward expansion of the German-speaking population. In 1500, there were five cities in Europe with populations greater than 100,000: Venice, Genoa , Naples , Milan , and – as the only example north of the Alps – Paris .
The reasons why Europe was able to gain a significant economic advantage over the other continents during the course of the early modern period are complex in nature. Initially, land – as the most important resource – played a central role, prompting landlords to engage in territorial expansion to gain ownership of more land. Additionally, the distribution of land was an effective method of ensuring the loyalty of vassals. In the archaic societies of central and Eastern Europe , where low population density meant that migration and innovation rarely became necessary, this form of land ownership persisted for a long time, surviving into the 19th century in some cases. In relatively densely populated regions – particularly in Western Europe , where land enclosure became increasingly common –, goods and knowledge were frequently exchanged, often across borders. The leading states of the European continent usually showed themselves to be open to innovations. This applied both to technological and commercial innovations, the latter primarily originating in Italy . 5 The term "commercial revolution" is often used to describe this process. 6.
An argument often advanced to explain the unique position of Europe among the continents is the cultural and economic heterogeneity of its states. Migration and communication were the real accelerating factors of European history. The specific mix of (Italian) city states, principalities, bishoprics, kingdoms, etc., and the concomitant intensification of interregional competition accelerated development towards modernity. The "permanent incongruence" of economic, political and cultural factors explains the competitive dynamic of the continent.
The advanced system of education and the early institutionalization of centres of artisanal and early-industrial training and production also played their part. The liberalization of trade, craftsmanship and industrial labour, as well as the emergence of parliamentary democracy provided an essential basis for the generation of economic growth, which was accompanied from the 18th century by an impressive growth in population. The restless search for new knowledge which was a central feature of modern humanism and the enlightenment gave the Old Continent its unmistakeable appearance.
During the period of the ancien régime , the Netherlands had the most efficient and the most comprehensive network of roads of all the countries of Western Europe. 7 From the late Middle Ages, increasing international trade made an international information and communications network necessary. As mediators between worlds, merchants often maintained their own courier services. For example, the Fuggers maintained a system of couriers between Augsburg and Venice in the 16th century. 8 Conurbations with intensive commercial activity subsequently emerged in and around Amsterdam , London and Paris, as well as in the Aachen - Lüttich and Ruhr regions . Per capita incomes and the standard of living rose much more quickly in these regions than elsewhere. However, the rapid industrialisation of Central, Western and Northern Europe required considerable resources. In the 19th century, coal replaced wood as the main source of energy. In the 20th century, oil largely replaced coal. Electricity, generated hydro-electrically, as well as coal, oil, nuclear energy and solar energy emerged as the most adaptable form of energy which was available almost everywhere. The transportation of this energy played an increasingly important role in international trade. 9.
The "Oligopolization" of the Global Economy.
In the period between the Industrial Revolution and the First World War, three powers were central in determining the rate of economic growth in Europe and Europe's relative importance in world events: Great Britain , Germany and France . In 1913, the last year in the first half of the 20th century which can be described as a "normal year", these three countries dominated large sections of the global economy. In this context, it is possible to speak of an "oligopolization" of the global economy, on which – along with the USA – these three states exerted the greatest influence. While these three countries contained less than half of the population of Europe, they accounted for approximately three quarters of Europe's industrial production and three quarters of all trade between Europe and the rest of the world. The high productivity levels of their economies were clearly reflected in the structure of their trade, i. e., in the exportation of industrial products and the importation of raw materials. As a result, these countries dominated the international flow of capital and direct foreign investment in the years before the First World War. In the absence of supranational economic institutions, Great Britain, which in London provided the central capital market of the world, in effect ensured that the global economy continued to function. 10 Besides, the Bank of England followed the principle of the gold standard in all money and capital markets of the world and Great Britain generally adhered to liberal political principles. However, it proved impossible to resurrect this system after the First World War. After the global catastrophe of the Great Depression, global trade volumes declined by 26% and European trade by 38%. 11.
In the period between the Great Crash and the Second World War, national concepts replaced unified (foreign) economic and currency policies in Europe. In 1932, Britain forfeited its policy of free trade and gave precedence to the Commonwealth. Economic policy in the Third Reich followed Hjalmar Schacht's (1877–1970) Neuer Plan , with a series of discriminatory measures and a reorientation of foreign trade towards Eastern Europe and Latin America . France tried to improve matters by binding public and private capital together in so-called mixed companies in the key industries. 12.
The Second World War not only blocked the circulation of goods and capital within Europe, but it brought an end to the global economy for decades by splitting Europe into an eastern and a western part. Italy, Austria , the Federal Republic of Germany , France and the other democratic states committed themselves to liberal, free market economics and social democracy, while Poland , Bulgaria , Romania , Czechoslovakia , Hungary and East Germany adopted the centrally planned economy model of the Soviet Union , until this system was brought to an end by the people through a peaceful revolution after 45 years. Even before this, the view had gained acceptance that the innovation-oriented system of free market economics was superior to the more static concept of central planning and dictatorial management, and there had been signs of the approaching dissolution of the latter.
The reunified Germany and the "old" European axis powers were then able to agree new European economic, currency, and trade policies under the auspices of European supranational institutions such as the Council of Europe and the European Central Bank. Already in 1957, six western European states founded the European Economic Community (EEC). The establishment of a customs union in 1968 was a decisive step towards further integration. The European Union (EU), which had 12 members in 1986 and increased to 27 in 2011, developed into one of the strongest economic powers in the world beside the USA, Japan and China. With the European Central Bank and the Euro, the European Union established a uniform legal means of payment, which increasingly became a kind of reserve currency alongside the American dollar.
Phases of Different Intensity and Concentration in Growth and Trade.
The expansion of European overseas trade did not occur in a linear fashion. Qualitatively and quantitatively, the 12th and 13th centuries, and the 16th and early 17th centuries were periods of strong commercial growth. Conversely, the 14th and 15th centuries, the second half of the 17th century and the first half of the 18th century must be viewed as phases of weaker or stagnating economic growth. 13.
The phases of pronounced expansion were usually accompanied by a strong increase in trade over land, primarily in a north-south direction (through the Champagne region in the Middle Ages, and through southern Germany in the second half of the 15th century and in the 16th century), but also in an east-west direction. In the 12th and 13th centuries, increasing sea-borne traffic in the Mediterranean provided a significant stimulus to transcontinental trade. Similarly, the phase of growth in transcontinental trade in the 16th century was accompanied by advances in Atlantic and intercontinental shipping. In the High Middle Ages, trade was also stimulated by the transportation of goods by caravan from regions in the Far East to Central Asia and finally to Eurasia . The southeastern European focal point of this trade was Venice, which – not coincidentally – was also the departure point of merchants such as the brothers Niccolò (1230–1300) and Maffeo Polo (1252–1309), and Niccolò's son Marco Polo (1254–1324)[ ]. 14 In the 16th century, expansion occurred along the coasts of Central and South America to the silver mines of Potosí (in present-day Bolivia ) and Zacatecas in Mexico , bringing Atlantic trade and European trade rich returns.
While European trade over land grew very slowly or stagnated in the late Middle Ages, trade between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea (Hanse), and between the ports of the North Sea (particularly Bruges ) and the ports of northern and central Italy increased considerably. Growth was clearly driven by maritime expansion. Those who controlled the ocean had a position of hegemony in intercontinental mercantilist trade. 15 From the 17th century, the trade in goods with regions outside of Europe grew as a result of the emergence of Dutch and British colonial trade. However, this could not fully compensate for the decrease in trade over land during the periods of weakness. In general, trade and economic development now occurred primarily in the central ports and their surrounding regions along the coasts of the European mainland. 16 It is in this context that some speak of the "économie du pourtour", or the economy of the surrounding area, which refers to a particular economic region – for example, the Mediterranean – and its specific development. 17.
In the two periods of weak European growth, growth in maritime trade in the overseas regions was not particularly spectacular either. On the contrary, during the great depression in the 14th and 15th centuries, the conquests of the Turks and, in particular, the Mongol Tatars deprived European trade of access to important markets in the Levant . During the second period of weak economic growth in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, European overseas trade did not begin to expand significantly again until after the Portuguese-Spanish colonial empire had been replaced by the Dutch-British empire. This involved a certain shift of geographical focus, but it was essentially based on simple trade and exchange at garrisons and coastal bases, as well as plantation agriculture, which bore characteristics of slash-and-burn economics. In other words, colonial expansion also remained an économie du pourtour .
From the mid-18th century, both transcontinental and sea-borne trade experienced strong growth. The targeted expansion of European transportation and trade infrastructure, and the gradual acceptance of liberal economic thought, which replaced protectionist mercantilism, resulted in the dawn of a new period of economic development not only in Europe, but also overseas. The integration of the colonial interior, which was begun by Great Britain during the 18th century, assumed considerable importance in the early 19th century with the emergence of the idea of the frontier . Britain's "new colonial system" gradually transformed into a North American cotton-producing industry which accompanied and supported the emergence of early-industrial mechanization in Europe. 18.
European Trade During Industrialization.
During the period of classical national economics, Adam Smith's (1723–1790)[ ] magnum opus The Wealth of Nations of 1776 provided a theoretical justification of free trade. However, a series of political events and external shocks called into question the practicality of free trade. These included, for example, the continental blockade which occurred during the course of Napoleonic expansion, which crippled trade and commerce for years. 19 Even the subsequent period of the Restoration must be viewed more as a regression into protectionism than a liberalization of trade. 20 However, the introduction of the Code civil (1804) and the Code de Commerce (1807) in France and in the regions under French influence, such as the kingdom of Westphalia , provided a modern (economic) system, which included rational regulations and made trade easier. The introduction of the metric system, the dissolution of the guilds, and the introduction of a progressive agrarian order were the cornerstones of the reform, which was gradually transferred to other European countries after the Restoration. Early industrialization and the post-Restoration phase were thus accompanied by broader systemic measures, such as various forms of agrarian reform ("peasant emancipation", "enclosures", etc.), anti-protectionism (customs union, commercial liberalisation, trade treaties with mutual most-favoured-status, Cobden treaty, etc.) and fiscal and financial rationalization (regulations and standards in the areas of measures, coinage and weights, as well as currency and bank reforms, etc.). These brought about a lasting improvement in the terms of trade of the countries involved, 21 thereby providing a relatively well-ordered and secure economic basis for the formation of nation-states. However, Europe was very diverse economically, and there were pioneers (Britain, France, Switzerland , etc.) and latecomers, which included southern and eastern Europe and most of the German lands. 22 However, the latecomers were able to learn from the mistakes made by the pioneers and to adapt the innovative technologies of the latter. Consequently, Germany, for example, was able to catch up very quickly in the late 19th century and even became the world leader in certain segments of the global market (chemistry, optics, steel industry, machinery, electrical engineering, etc.) by the outbreak of the First World War. 23 Comparative research into productivity gives many indicators of how the economies of the European states developed differently and at different times. 24.
European industrialization lead to a rapid increase in demand for agricultural and industrial raw materials as well as for other goods, and it made the provision of quicker, cheaper and more efficient means of transportation and communication necessary . Both internal European trade and trade between Europe and the rest of the world were considerably boosted by determinedly liberal trade policies, which were, however, increasingly called into question after 1914 and ultimately completely abandoned during the interwar years (to be reintroduced after the Second World War). Nevertheless, technological innovations, air transport, and the emergence of new means of communication (telex, electronic communication, etc.) resulted in the increasingly intensive integration of Europe and the world, although industrial development proceeded slowly, if at all, in the countries on the European periphery. For example, there were tendencies towards de-industrialization in the Balkans . 25.
The First World War moved the axes of global trade. The international currency system disintegrated, and in 1914 countries such as Russia , Germany and France abandoned the convertibility of their currencies into gold. Since the most serious events of the war occurred on the European continent, they damaged structures of production and considerably harmed economic growth there. The high costs involved in converting factories from peacetime to war production, naval blockades, risk premiums, increasing inflation, and the rapidly rising cost of transactions due to the war damaged the European continent. As a result, the global economic order had undergone fundamental change to the advantage of America by 1918. Europe's portion of the world social product was declining.
The interwar years were defined by crises like no other period. Even in many European countries, currency and financial systems disintegrated. In particular, Weimar Germany was hit by a series of crises and political setbacks, for example the assassination of politicians such as Matthias Erzberger (1875–1921) and Walther Rathenau (1867–1922)[ ], hyperinflation in 1923, and the global financial crisis in 1929, which plunged large parts of Europe into massive deflation with extremely high unemployment . France, Great Britain and southern and eastern Europe were also affected by the dire global financial climate, or were weakened by internal revolts. Protectionism blossomed in the interwar period, resulting in a kind of "de-Europeanization" of the global economy. The industrial nations outside Europe, particularly the USA, Canada and Japan, saw their portion of the global market increase, while the portion of global exports of the three big countries in Europe (France, Great Britain, Germany) decreased.
The dominance of protectionism and state intervention resulted in a kind of splintering of the global economy into systems and preference zones which were isolated from one another to a greater or lesser degree. Interwar Germany accessed energy resources and raw materials in eastern and southeastern Europe to strengthen its industry, but it neglected its consumer goods industry. In general, the interwar period in Europe was characterized by economic and social disintegration, and the "European house" had to be rebuilt from its foundations after the Second World War. This involved decreasing the amount of money in circulation, establishing monetary order, and making the European countries fit to re-join the global market. Thanks in large part to the Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program), these goals were largely achieved and impressive export-led economic growth followed. The OEEC ( Organization for European Economic Cooperation ) provided an effective institutional basis for this process. As a result of the Schuman Plan and conciliation efforts on all levels, Germany, France, the Benelux states and Italy were able to establish a relatively stable basis for European integration. The cautious attempts to influence industrial development involved in the Coal and Steel Pact 26 ultimately led to the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. In the following year, the European Parliament was established in Strasbourg with Robert Schuman (1886–1963)[ ] as its first president. The Treaties of Rome (25th of March, 1957), on which the EEC was based, constituted a first big step on the road to European political and economic integration. This not only provided a strong stimulus to "internal" integration, but also built an initial framework for external relations.
With a 20% share of all global imports and exports, the European Union is the largest commercial power in the 21st century, 27 followed by the USA, China and Japan. In 2010, goods to the value of 15,238 billion US dollars were exported worldwide (in 2009, it was 12,522 billion dollars). This equates to a growth of approximately 21.7% from 2009. The main exporters were the People's Republic of China, the USA, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands. These five countries together accounted for 35.9% of worldwide goods exports. In 2010, China was at the top of the list of the world's strongest exporting nations for the second time, followed by the USA and Germany. 28.
Europe and the African World.
The discovery and conquest of Africa, America and East India in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period had long-lasting effects on the territories and regions involved. During the course of the 15th century, Portugal – centrally located at the connection between the two Atlantic zones – was able to conquer strategic locations along the west coast of Africa and in the African Atlantic region, though these bases suffered serious reversals between 1475 and 1480. 29 In the 1440s, the Portuguese expanded their trade in African slaves in the coastal region of the Rio de Oro, which they were now able to conduct without the assistance of Asian and African middlemen. These strongly fortified settlements, such as those on the west African island of Arguim and in the town of Elmina in present-day Ghana , were not only centres of the slave trade, but also served as bases for the trade in gold, malagueta pepper, ivory and other trade goods.
Initially, it was Italian sailors and captains who, in the service of Portugal, explored the Atlantic islands off North Africa . 30 In 1312, Lanzarotto Malocello (ca. 1270–1336), who came from the region around Genoa, discovered the Canary Islands . Lanzarote was named after him. In the early 15th century, the Portuguese secured further towns and islands in the region, for example Ceuta in 1415, Madeira in 1418, the Azores in 1427 and Cape Bojador on the African mainland. Subsequently, further bases along the west coast of Africa were added, progressing from north to south: Cabo Branco in 1441, Cape Verde in 1444, and the mouth of River Gambia in 1446. In 1456, the Italian Alvise Cadamosto (1432–1488), who was in the service of Henry the Navigator (1394–1460), claimed the Cape Verde Islands for Portugal. 31 Sierra Leone was claimed in 1460, and Fort São Jorge da Mina was constructed two years later. Here, the Portuguese began to trade extensively, acquiring African gold in return for red and blue dyed cloth, head scarves, coral from Europe, brass armbands from Germany, and Portuguese white wine. In this trade as in the slave trade, yellow and red mussels from the Canaries were used as money. 32.
In the early modern period, Africa became the preferred region of operation of the privileged trading companies. England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and a number of other European countries delivered manufactured goods made of glass, metal and textiles, as well as weapons and alcohol to Africa in exchange for slaves, provisions, gold, etc. This European-African trade was often just one leg of the so-called triangular trade between Europe, Africa and America. This system of trade remained dominant from the 17th to the early 19th century, at which point the increasingly pervasive ban on slave trading shifted the focus of trade in Africa. Most of the African states became dependent on European colonial powers who reduced them to the status of suppliers of raw materials and comprehensively exploited them. Similar to South America, monocultures emerged in Africa which were heavily dependent on the weather conditions and the harvest cycle. Water shortages, famines, low per capita incomes and low literacy levels remain the consequences of African "modernity" up to the present. In many African states, the economic dominance of Western states persists up to the present, often referred to as neo-colonialism in the literature. The continuing demand for raw materials on the global market could greatly improve growth and the balance of trade in the resource-rich states of Africa if the resulting export surpluses were invested in the respective countries and found their way into the pockets of consumers there. In general, large differences in per capita incomes exist between the individual African states. The economic reality of Africa is too complex to be described solely in terms of dependency theories or the world system approach. 33.
Europe, the Orient and Asia.
Leaving aside classical antiquity, territorial expansion from Europe towards Asia can be traced back to the period of the crusades, which lasted from the end of the 11th to the 13th century. Along the routes followed by the crusaders to southeastern Europe, across the Balkans and to the Levant, an impressive infrastructure emerged to meet the weaponry and provisioning needs of a few hundred thousand crusading knights and pilgrims bound for Jerusalem . Many of these provisioning stations were subsequently used by Italian and other European merchants for the transportation of goods to and from the Middle East and the Levant. Venice proved to be particularly well-placed geographically to benefit from this trade. It became the focal point for the exchange of goods and information between Asia and Europe, 34 and a "model" for the subsequent trade networks of the colonial powers of Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain. 35 The golden age of the lagoon city reached a climax after the conquest of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade (1199–1204). It is no coincidence that it was Venetian merchants like Niccolò, Maffeo and Marco Polo who helped to establish the trade in goods with the Chinese Empire and even established diplomatic relations with the court of Kublai Khan (1215–1295). In doing so, they utilized existing routes such as the Silk Road , an important axis of medieval "global trade" which grew in importance in the late 13th and 14th centuries. This had a profound effect not only on the material culture of Europe, but also on Europeans' idea of Asia. In the Battle of Curzola in 1298, Marco Polo was taken into Genoese captivity, and he described his journey to the writer Rusticiano da Pisa while in prison. Through the writings of the latter, some details of Polo's experiences in China entered the mosaic of images, facts and beliefs which Europeans associated with China. In addition to members of the Polo family, other contemporaries also set out for Central Asia, such as the Flanders native Wilhelm von Rubruk (ca. 1210–1270) who set out in May 1253. Many were clergymen, such as the Franciscan Johannes von Montecorvino (1247–1328) who visited India and reported on spices such as pepper and cinnamon, and on the culinary habits of the Indians. Odorico da Pordenone (ca. 1286–1331) from Udine , who was also a Franciscan monk, travelled in 1314/1315 via Ceylon , Java , Singapore and southern China to Peking , and he reported on his experiences, both ordinary and extraordinary. More than 110 of his manuscripts have survived, and his influence has been significant. 36.
Whereas the Polos had travelled to Asia primarily by land, sea voyages to Asia increased from 1488 onward when Bartholomeu Diaz (ca. 1450–1500) from Portugal became the first to sail around the Cape of Good Hope . The establishment of the Portuguese empire in India made European-Asian relationships more permanent and secure. In some cases, Italian sea captains and southern German capital participated in these voyages. 37 In the context of this double expansion in the Atlantic region and in the Far East, Lisbon became increasingly central and pivotal in global trade. It was no coincidence that many overseas expeditions by important explorers began in the Portuguese capital.
The first expeditions to Asia during and after the discovery of the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope and into the Indian Ocean witnessed conspicuous efforts on the part of southern, central and western European merchants and consortia to promote their interests in the east by means of agents. For example, wealthy Nuremberg and Augsburg merchants, and Dutchmen participated in the first voyages to India. Following the punctual pattern established in Africa, the Portuguese began to fortify ports and towns in strategically important places, in order to make them impervious to attacks. The cities of Calicut and Goa are examples on the Indian west coast. Development in the early modern period was dominated by the privileged trading companies of the Dutch and the British, but also of smaller states such as Denmark . 38.
From the 17th century, the Netherlands played a leading role in trade between Europe and the rest of the world, particularly trade with Asia. In the 18th century, Great Britain dominated the Asian markets, though its focus was on India instead of Indonesia and Southeast Asia . The British East India Company, founded in 1600, and the Dutch East India Company , founded in 1602, dominated markets in the Indian Ocean and – to a lesser extent – in the South China Sea . Their power extended far beyond trade, and it resulted in a "golden age" in Holland and its main city, Amsterdam. 39.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, parts of Asia were increasingly drawn into the process of European industrialization. India in particular, as part of the Commonwealth, became an important source of raw materials (particularly cotton) as well as food and stimulants (particularly tea). The period of industrialization and of the rise of the middle class in Europe would not have been possible without these supplies and the intensification of exchange with Asia. The building of railways – a European innovation – began in the 19th century in Turkey , India, Japan and China, with lasting consequences for the territorialisation of economics and trade, and it provided the basis for further trade. The telegraph line between Calcutta and London, which was constructed by Siemens and opened in 1870, gave an important new stimulus to trade and the exchange of information between Europe and Asia. In all regions of Asia, enclaves and cities remained in European ownership until relatively recently, as in the case of Hong Kong which the British only relinquished in 1997.
America, the Pacific and Asia.
If one defines interdependence as a regular, planned, systematic, on-going and reciprocal exchange of information and goods, then one can observe the beginning of American-Asian relations in 1519, at which time the Manila fleets began to sail regularly from Acapulco (Mexico) to Indonesia, or more specifically to the port city and trading centre of Manila on the Philippines . They brought precious metals, particularly silver, from Central America to Asia and usually transported spices, silks, porcelain and jewels back. Pearls from the islands of Cubagua and Margarita off the coast of Venezuela were also traded overseas. In the 16th century, this trade prompted southern German merchants such as Christoph Herwart (1464–1529) to get involved in trade with India. 40.
Europe Meets Australia in the 17th Century.
It can be assumed that the discovery of the Cape York Peninsula by the Dutchman Willem Jansz (ca. 1570–1630) in 1606 was one of the first instances of economic contact between Europe and Australia. A decade later, Dirk Hartog (1580–1621) reached the west coast of Australia. During the course of the 17th century, Willem de Vlamingh (1640–1698) and William Dampier (1651–1715) "discovered" other parts of the Australian continent, thereby facilitating the more concentrated exploration and mapping of Australia. From a European perspective, Australia did not play a significant role in trade, though there was some British foreign investment in Australia before the First World War. This was focused primarily on the building and financing of infrastructure projects (railways, harbours, public buildings, etc.). Conversely, Australian wool and mutton were exported to Europe. 41.
Europe, the Atlantic and America.
The beginning of relatively regular economic relations between Europe and America occurred in the 16th century. The initial contact with America which Vikings under Erik the Red (950–ca. 1005) established around 1000 BC cannot be described as a lasting exchange; neither can such exchange be said to have existed in the first two or three decades after America was rediscovered by the Genoese sailor Christopher Columbus (1451–1506). 42.
Trade between the Old World and the New World constantly experienced fluctuations which were caused by by economic growth and developments such as the discovery, mining and transportation of precious metals. This was true in particular of silver and gold from South America and Central America, and later from North America. The supply of coin metal to European states from overseas affected the currency stability, liquidity, monetary independence, and ultimately the profitability of early modern capital markets. However, due to insufficient domestic production, Spain was constantly dependent on imports from Asia, and a considerable portion of the precious metals imported from South America was transferred to Asia via Cádiz and Seville as payment. Consequently, the quantity of precious metals which was used to mint coins in Spain and Portugal should not be overestimated. The inflationary effect of imported precious metals was therefore less significant than has been assumed. 43.
Around the beginning of the 16th century, Portugal's double expansion continued with its turning westward and commencing to colonize Brazil . Impressive colonial cities came into being on the coast, such as Salvador do Bahia , the first capital city of Brazil. The eastern part of South America had been granted to the Portuguese by Pope Alexander VI (1492–1503) in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) . Around 1500, Pedro Alvarez Cabral (ca. 1468–1520) claimed mainland Brazil for Portugal, and expeditions during the course of the 16th century, such as those by Martim Afonso de Sousa (1500–1564), explored the Brazilian interior. During this time, several groups of Portuguese Jesuits founded towns and the earliest sugar cane plantations in Brazil. One such sugar mill was acquired by the Schetz company of Antwerp in 1540. 44 Sugar production in Brazil was able to increase vastly in scale because of the use of African slaves, thereby paving the way for the basic forms of tropical agricultural production which were to become the predominant forms in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean , as well as in the southern part of North America. Brazil played a large role in supplying Europe with inexpensive sugar in the early modern period due to big increases in productivity in the cultivation of sugar cane which brought down the price of sugar. A similar development occurred in the case of maize, cocoa, coffee, tobacco and cotton.
In the second third of the 16th century, transatlantic relations intensified, due in part to the discovery of precious metals in South America. During the course of the discovery of the American continent, not only did people of different ethnic backgrounds encounter one another, the material culture was also greatly enriched, for example by the arrival of previously unknown plants, animals and goods in Europe. Medieval Europe had no knowledge of cocoa and, consequently, of chocolate. Some present-day dietary staples such as maize and the potato, which – like tapioca and nasturtium – are good sources of carbohydrates, were previously unknown in Europe also. Equally new to Europeans were sugar-rich plants such as sugar maple and protein-rich legumes such as beans. Other plants such as peanuts provided oil and fat. New vegetable types such as tomatoes, peppers and pumpkins, and nuts and fruits from avocados and pineapples to guavas and papayas appeared on European tables. Europe became acquainted with intoxicants such as the products of the maté tree and the coca bush. Spices such as vanilla, allspice and chili contributed to the refinement of European culinary tastes. Tobacco was also cultivated in Europe for the first time in the early modern period. It is beyond question that the exchange of new types of food and stimulants has had an effect on patterns of behaviour – and even on architecture – in the modern period. Smoking rooms or gentlemen's rooms containing pipe stands, ashtrays, matches and similar utensils were a given in 18th-century and 19th-century villas. Coffee houses were often popular meeting places for artists and literati, and were consequently much-frequented places for meeting and communication which had a considerable effect on the culture of large European cities.
New types of wood, such as rare pine species and mahogany, appeared in the sitting rooms of affluent Europeans. Quebracho trees and various species of mangrove provided tannic acid. Rubber trees and sweet potato trees provided rubber, while the wax palm, the carnauba palm and the jojoba provided wax. The variety of dyes available was also increased by access to tropical plants, ranging from the brazil wood to the redwood, the logwood, the yellowwood, and indigo, which began to replace woad in Europe. The New World was also a source of numerous plants which provided insecticides, such as barbasco roots, the bitterwood, and the cashew nut; even tobacco falls into this category. Today "American" plants are even used as fuel sources, as experiments with tapioca, maize and species of copaiba demonstrate. 45.
Conversely, Europe enriched the American continent by the introduction of new animal and plant species, as well as new inventions, cultivation techniques and ideas. These ranged from horses, cattle, donkeys and hens to honeybees and silkworms, and from new types of cereals such as barley to apples, apricots, almonds, various types of cabbage, carrots, aubergines, flax and garlic. Europeans also introduced a vast array of weapons and craft tools, as well as institutional innovations such as Roman law, which was established in many states of North and South America. There were also innovations such as the amalgamation process for extracting silver and gold from ores using mercury, or book printing, which accelerated and intensified the transfer of information and knowledge from the Old World to the New World.
To summarize, the encounter between the material and intellectual cultures of Europe and America resulted in enormous mutual enrichment and inspiration. 46 However, it also had negative effects, such as the transfer of diseases in both directions. Many more indigenous Americans died as a result of "European" diseases than died in violent confrontations during the course of the Conquista . Conversely, European travellers contracted "American" illnesses which had not existed in medieval Europe.
The Netherlands, England, France, and other European countries (Denmark, Sweden , Austria, Prussia , Switzerland, etc.) sought to gain access to trade in Asia, Africa and America by means of privileged companies. In the 17th and 18th centuries, this often took the form of the so-called triangular trade, i. e., participation in trade with Africa, America and the Caribbean, and the rest of Europe, African trade being largely synonymous with slave trading. Slaves were bought in exchange for European manufactured goods and subsequently transported to the large estates of the West Indies and America on special slave ships. 47 In the early modern period, 10 to 12 million Africans were taken in this way to the New World, from where colonial produce was transported to Europe. Privileged European trading companies were also employed in Atlantic trade, such as the Royal African Company and the Hudson's Bay Company, the Dutch West India Company and corresponding French companies.
The expanding European settlements in America required a growing number of labourers for the work on plantations and other possessions. As a result, the triangular trade persisted until the abolition movement of the 19th century. Denmark and Great Britain abolished slavery in 1807, followed by the USA in 1808, and Holland and France in 1814. In addition to the role played by the American and French revolutions in promoting freedom and human rights, economic interests played a decisive role in this process. New economic systems which emerged as a result of the industrial revolutions began to replace old mercantilist forms. The emerging polypolistic variety of markets was accompanied by the intensification of market formation and of competition. An economic transformation occurred, which introduced new institutional forms, a liberal economic and social order, and a radical integration of world markets. Subsequently, global exports grew as a proportion of the world social product from approximately 1% in 1825 to approximately 8% in 1900, and finally to approximately 16% in 2000. The global economy has multiplied by 44 since 1820, and global trade has grown in volume by a factor of 600 in the same period.
Up to the First World War, Western Europe undoubtedly contributed most to the world gross social product. In 1913, it accounted for 906 billion international dollars (of a total of 1990 billion), which equates to 33.5% of the World Gross Domestic Product (GDP). By 1950, this percentage declined to 26.3%, and by 1998 to 20.6%. 48 While Europe's trade with territories in the rest of the world grew in absolute terms, it became less important in relative terms since trade relations between the industrialized countries grew disproportionately quickly in significance.
Rolf Walter , Jena.
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^ Glamann, Der europäische Handel 1983, pp. 271–333, here: 271. ^ Walter, Globalisierung 2011, pp. 7ff.; also contains the term "proto-globalization". ^ Kellenbenz, Handbuch Europäische Wirtschafts - und Sozialgeschichte 1986, vol. 3. ^ Cameron, Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft 1992, vol. 2, pp. 15ff., 181ff. ^ See the following works: Melis, Il comercio transatlantico 1954; de Maddalena, La ricchezza dell'Europa 1992; de Roover, Business 1974 und Cassandro, L'irradiazione economica fiorentina 1995. ^ See: Lopez, The Commercial Revolution 1976; Rapp, Unmaking 1975. ^ Blockmans, Macht 1998, p. 37. ^ Behringer, Fugger und Taxis 1986, pp. 242f. ^ Fremdling, Technologischer Wandel 1986, passim. ^ Burk, Money and Power 1992, p. 359. ^ Pinder, Europa in der Weltwirtschaft 1986, pp. 377f., 382. ^ ibid., p. 386. ^ Walter, Globalisierung 2011, p. 9. ^ Reichert, Begegnungen 1992. ^ Diwald, Weltmeere 1980, pp. 269 ff. and passim; Scammell, The World Encompassed 1981. ^ Van der Wee / Aerts, De economische ontwikkeling van Europa 1994, pp. 167f. ^ Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, vol. 2, 1986. ^ Mieck, Handbuch EWSG, vol. 4, 1993; Bayly, Birth 2004; Walter, Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2011, pp. 74ff. ^ Walter, Commerz 1987, pp. 193–218, here: 195f. ^ Kutz, Außenhandel 1974, passim. ^ Von Borries, Außenhandel 1970, pp. 82ff. and passim. ^ See: Gerschenkron, Backwardness 1968. ^ See: Fremdling, Wirtschaftswachstum 1985; Grabas, Konjunktur 1992. ^ See: Fremdling / O'Brian 1983. ^ Fäßler, Globalisierung 2007, p. 97. ^ Walter, Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2011, p. 262. ^ Europäische Union, Trade 2012. ^ WTO, International Trade Statistics 2011. ^ Kraus / Ottomeyer, Novos mundos 2007. ^ Verlinden, Atlantischer Raum und Indische-Ozean-Zone 1982. ^ Ankenbauer, "das ich mochte meer newer dyng erfaren" 2010, pp. 80ff. ^ Teixeira da Mota, Der portugiesische Seehandel 1969, pp. 7ff.; Hogendorn / Johnson, The Shell Money 1986. ^ Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. 1–3, 1974–1988, passim. ^ Martin / Romano, Venice Reconsidered 2000. ^ Van der Wee, Structural changes 1990, pp. 14–33. ^ Reichert, Erfahrung der Welt 2001, pp. 165ff., 203ff. and passim; idem, Begegnungen 1992, pp. 287–293. ^ Wiesflecker, Neue Beiträge 2005, pp. 647ff.; Kalus, Pfeffer 2010. ^ Nagel, Abenteuer Fernhandel 2007 (see the informative maps on pp. 33, 73, 103); Krieger, Kaufleute, Seeräuber und Diplomaten 1998. ^ Israel, Dutch Primacy 1989; North, Das Goldene Zeitalter 2001, pp. 19ff. and passim. ^ Kellenbenz, Ostindienhandel 1991; Walter, Oberdeutsche 2001, p. 42 and passim; Kalus, Pfeffer 2010, pp. 74, 106 and passim. ^ Cameron, Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft 1992, vol. 2, pp. 108f. ^ Walter, Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft 2006, pp. 103ff. ^ Pieper, Preisrevolution 1985, passim; Hamilton, American Treasure 1934. ^ Kellenbenz, Dreimal Lateinamerika 1990, p. 190. ^ Ewald, Pflanzen Iberoamerikas 1995, pp. 48ff. ^ Crosby, Columbian Exchange 1972, passim. ^ See: Degn, Die Schimmelmanns 2000; Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade 1999. ^ Maddison, The World Economy 2001, p. 261, Table B-18.
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Zitierempfehlung Citation.
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Effects of the early modern global trade system

Rethinking the rise of the West: Global Commodities.
Konstantin Georgidis, Canterbury School, Ft. Myers, Florida.
China and Europe, 1500-2000 and Beyond: What is "Modern"?
CLASS ACTIVITIES: Comparing and Contrasting Points of View.
D. Silver Connects the World: Europe, East Asia, and West Africa.
Have students watch the third segment of the video "Early Global Commodities" on the web site. Click here to view. Have students read the following excerpts from secondary sources:
Silver Connects the World: Europe, East Asia, and West Africa.
"The effects of the global trade in silver were worldwide and linked the world in new and unprecedented ways. This segment explores some of those effects in Japan, West Africa, the Americas, China, and Europe.
In Japan, the Tokugawa shoguns grew rich off the trade in silver, which they used to strengthen the state against warlords. In addition, the global silver trade encouraged the Japanese to produce other commodities for export, which then made their way to the Americas, Europe, and West Africa.
In West Africa, Europeans involved in global trading networks brought a variety of commodities to coastal regions to trade for gold, local goods, and slaves. Eventually, this trade had profound effects on West African society: It reoriented trade routes toward the coast rather than across the Sahara, which led to the decline of interior states. It also led to an increasing traffic in humans to work, among other places, in the silver mines of the Americas.
In the Americas, silver mining at Potosí led to the deaths of eight million Indians. Meanwhile, Mexican silver production — which exceeded Peruvian production by the eighteenth century — resulted in the minting of half a billion Mexican pesos that were then used for currency in China, India, and West Africa.
In China, the demand for silver initially drove the global economy. Then, by 1750, silver glutted the Chinese market, bringing its price down and leading to inflation. The devaluation of silver in China had a devastating financial effect on Spain as well — a fact that allowed its European competitors to gain the upper hand in a new global trade focused on sugar, tobacco, gold, and slaves."
"China’s demand for silver remained at the center of the world economic system until about 1750. Finally, tens of thousands of tons of silver glutted China’s market. The value of silver fell, and China’s economy was rocked by inflation. Fluctuating values of silver caused the real salaries of Chinese officials to rise and fall, encouraging graft and corruption. For Spain, the declining value of silver meant disaster. So much so that the Spanish crown actually experienced bankruptcies during times of record silver production. But, just as the Pacific economy stumbled, the Atlantic economy picked up because of profits from the circular movements of slaves, sugar, tobacco, and gold. Europeans weaned themselves from deficit trading of silver, and eventually the balance of economic power shifted in their favor. One uniquely significant commodity was also traded between West Africans and Europeans, beginning in the sixteenth century: human beings. The presence of Europeans along African coasts ultimately led to the forced migrations of twelve million Africans. Trade in slaves to work the silver mines and plantations of the New World reached its peak during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, European traders carried Japanese silks to West Africa on their return voyages from Asia. African merchants then sold them to local weavers, who unraveled the silks and rewove the threads into traditional patterns like the kente cloth of the Gold Coast of West Africa. The Portuguese found themselves needing to rely on local communities in order to establish trade. They established “El Mina” (“The Mine”) in the fifteenth century, which became a permanent base for Portuguese trading expeditions into the African interior and across the Atlantic Ocean. Once El Mina was established, it became a magnet of opportunity; it attracted trade from the interior; it reoriented the trade routes; and it brought goods south to the coast instead of north. Many societies declined in the African interior because of the growth of opportunity on the coast."
"It is important to also keep in mind that China’s importation of hundreds of millions, indeed billions, of pesos in silver during the past five centuries implied Chinese exports of an equivalent value of silks, ceramics, tea, and other products. Such massive exports forced additional restructuring of the Chinese economy. Marks has recently documented how long distance trade (both domestic and international) caused specialization of production by region throughout China. That is to say, the full story is much more complex than simply exporting silks and other products in exchange for Japanese/ Spanish-American silver imports. These global circuits of exchange interacted with circuits normally considered local or regional in scope. Augmented silk exports from Jiangnan, for instance, implied the devotion of more land there to mulberries, which means increased rice coming down river from Hunan to feed mulberry growers. The point is, global trade transforms local ecologies, a central message in the work of Marks and others. China was transformed as a result of interaction with a global network.
It may be tempting to view a remote mining center like Potosí—at an altitude above 13,000 feet and a thousand miles (2.5 months by pack animal) distance from Lima on the Pacific—to have been relatively detached from other areas of South America. Helmer informs us, however, that around 1610 Tucuman in Argentina sent timber, 4,000 cattle, and 60,000 mules per year to Potosí (some 600 mountainous miles away) in support of that mining city of 160,000 people. The fact is that the economies of most of South America, Central America, and Mexico were deeply affected by the silver industry, an industry with economic tentacles penetrating into the social fabric of all populated continents.
The intercontinental trade in monies—silver, gold, copper, and cowrie shells—involved people of all classes, not just the rich. The Single Whip tax reform in China during the 1570s, for example, replaced numerous taxes with a single tax, while also specifying that most Chinese (including peasants) must pay taxes annually in silver. Conversion to a silver system was also strong in relatively sparsely populated Southeast Asia: One way or another silver had become irresistible as the effective international currency of Southeast Asia by about 1630, whether in rials, as in most of the island world, or in weight. In spite of the status the royal gold coins had, the rulers themselves came to expect taxes and fines to be paid in silver. The triumph of silver undoubtedly furthered the integration of Southeast Asia into a world economy. Southeast Asia also imported volumes of Chinese copper cash as well as lead picis as local media of exchange; most of the silver gravitated to the giant Chinese marketplace.
Our analysis is mostly compatible with the vision proposed in Andre Gunder Frank’s controversial ReORIENT (1998). Yet, we disagree with Frank’s contention that China was enriched as a result of its importation of silver. We argue (Flynn and Giráldez 2000) that China’s multicentury absorption of tens of thousands of tons of foreign silver involved an immense drain of wealth from Chinese society. 43 Our argument essentially states that the multicentury “silverization” of China involved substitution of a resource-using money (silver) in place of a money that had been nearly costless to produce (paper); China’s immense exports (of mainly nonmonetary items in exchange for silver imports) can be viewed as a measure of the social cost of maintaining a silver-based economy. Ironically, acceptance of our position that China’s silver imports involved immense social costs, rather than social benefits, actually supports Frank’s main emphasis on the global economic significance of China prior to the nineteenth century. China’s ability to absorb the immense cost of converting its monetary and fiscal systems from paper to silver—while nonetheless remaining the world’s dominant economy for centuries underscores the scale of the Chinese economy as global juggernaut."
All above excerpts come from the following source:
Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth Century," Journal of World History 13, no. 2(Fall 2002): 391–427.

Effects of the early modern global trade system

War and Economic History.
[The following is before copyediting and differs slightly from the published version.]
War and Economic History.
War has influenced economic history profoundly across time and space. Winners of wars have shaped economic institutions and trade patterns. Wars have influenced technological developments. Above all, recurring war has drained wealth, disrupted markets, and depressed economic growth.
Wars are expensive (in money and other resources), destructive (of capital and human capital), and disruptive (of trade, resource availability, labor management). Large wars constitute severe shocks to the economies of participating countries. Notwithstanding some positive aspects of short-term stimulation and long-term destruction and rebuilding, war generally impedes economic development and undermines prosperity. Several specific economic effects of war recur across historical eras and locales.
The most consistent short-term economic effect of war is to push up prices, and consequently to reduce living standards. This war-induced inflation was described in ancient China by the strategist Sun Tzu: "Where the army is, prices are high; when prices rise the wealth of the people is exhausted" (Tzu Sun, c.400 BCE) His advice was to keep wars short and have the money in hand before assembling an army.
Paying for wars is a central problem for states ( see War Finance). This was especially true in early modern Europe (fifteenth to eighteenth centuries), when war relied heavily on mercenary forces. The king of Spain was advised that waging war required three things - money, money, and more money. Spain and Portugal imported silver and gold from America to pay for armies, but in such large quantities that the value of these metals eventually eroded.
One way governments pay for war is to raise taxes (which in turn reduces civilian spending and investment). U. S. revolutionary Thomas Paine warned in 1787 that "war . has but one thing certain, and that is to increase taxes." Another way to pay for war is to borrow money, which increases government debt, but war-related debts can drive states into bankruptcy as they did to Spain in 1557 and 1596. A third way to fund war is to print more currency, which fuels inflation. Inflation thus often acts as an indirect tax on a national economy to finance war.
Industrial warfare, and especially the two World Wars, created inflationary pressures across large economies. Increasingly, governments mobilized entire societies for war - conscripting labor, bidding up prices in markets for natural resources and industrial goods, and diverting capital and technology from civilian to military applications. World War I caused ruinous inflation as participants broke from the gold standard and issued currency freely. Inflation also accompanied the U. S. Civil War, World War II, and the Vietnam War, among others. War-induced inflation, although strongest in war zones, extends to distant belligerents, such as the United States in the World Wars, and, in major wars, even to neutral countries, owing to trade disruption and scarcities.
Present-day wars continue to fuel inflation and drive currencies towards worthlessness. In Angola's civil war (1975-2002), for example, the government currency became so useless that an alternative "hard" currency - bottles of beer - came to replace it in many daily transactions.
In addition to draining money and resources from participants' economies, most wars create zones of intense destruction of capital such as farms, factories, and cities. These effects severely depress economic output. The famine and plague that accompanied the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) killed as much as one-third of Germany's population, as mercenaries plundered civilians and civilians became mercenaries to try to survive. World War I reduced French production by nearly half, starved hundreds of thousands of Germans to death, and led to more than a decade of lower Soviet output. One estimate put World War I's total cost at $400 billion - five times the value of everything in France and Belgium at the time.
Battle casualties, war-induced epidemics, and other demographic disruptions have far-reaching effects. World War I contributed to the 1918 influenza epidemic that killed millions. Military forces in East Africa may have sparked the outbreak of what became a global AIDS epidemic. Quincy Wright estimates that "at least 10 percent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war" (Wright, 1942). The U. S. "baby boom" after World War II continues decades later to shape economic policy debates ranging from school budgets to social security. Wars also temporarily shake up gender relations (among other demographic variables), as when men leave home and women take war jobs to replenish the labor force, as in the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States during World War II.
Countries that can fight wars beyond their borders avoid the most costly destruction (though not the other costs of war). For example, the Dutch towards the end of the Thirty Years' War, the British during the Napoleonic Wars, the Japanese in World War I, and the Americans in both World Wars enjoyed this relative insulation from war's destruction, which meanwhile weakened their economic rivals.
Positive Economic Effects.
War is not without economic benefits, however. These are not limited to having misfortune strike trade rivals. At certain historical times and places, war can stimulate a national economy in the short term. During slack economic times, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s, military spending and war mobilization can increase capacity utilization, reduce unemployment (through conscription), and generally induce patriotic citizens to work harder for less compensation.
War also sometimes clears away outdated infrastructure and allows economy-wide rebuilding, generating long-term benefits (albeit at short-term costs). For example, after being set back by the two World Wars, French production grew faster after 1950 than before 1914.
Technological development often follows military necessity in wartime. Governments can coordinate research and development to produce technologies for war that also sometimes find civilian uses (such as radar in World War II). The layout of European railroad networks were strongly influenced by strategic military considerations, especially after Germany used railroads effectively to overwhelm French forces in 1870-71. In the 1990s, the GPS navigation system, created for U. S. military use, found wide commercial use. Although these war-related innovations had positive economic effects, it is unclear whether the same money spent in civilian sectors might have produced even greater innovation.
Overall, the high costs of war outweigh the positive spinoffs. Indeed, a central dilemma for states is that waging wars - or just preparing for them - undermines prosperity, yet losing wars is worse. Winning wars, however, can sometimes pay.
Conquest, Trade, and Accumulation.
Nearly all wars are fought over control of territory, and sometimes over specific economic resources such as minerals, farmland, or cities. The patterns of victory and defeat in wars through history have shaped the direction of the world economy and its institutions. For example, when Portugal in the 16 th century used ship-borne cannons to open sea routes to Asia and wrested the pepper trade away from Venice (which depended on land routes through the Middle East), it set in motion a profound shift in Europe's economic center of gravity away from the Mediterranean and towards the Atlantic.
Wars of conquest can more than pay for themselves, if successful. The nomadic horse-raiders of the Iron Age Eurasian steppes found profit in plunder. Similarly, the 17 th - to 18 th - century Dahomey Kingdom (present-day Benin) made war on its neighbors to capture slaves, whom it sold to Europeans at port (for guns to continue its wars). War benefitted the Dahomey Kingdom at the expense of its depopulated neighbors. Likewise, present-day armies in Democratic Congo and Sierra Leone are fighting to control diamond production areas, which in turn fund those armies. According to one controversial school of thought, states in undertaking wars behave as rational actors maximizing their net benefits. However, wars are fought for many reasons beyond conquering valuable commodities.
Successful empires have used war to centralize control of an economic zone, often pushing that zone in directions most useful to continued military strength. Transportation and information infrastructures reflect the central authority's political control. When European states conquered overseas colonies militarily (16 th to 19 th centuries), they developed those colonies economically to benefit the mother country. For example, most railroads in southwestern Africa were built - and still run - from mining and plantation areas to ports. Empires, however, inherently suffer the problems of centralized economies, such as inefficiency, low morale, and stagnation. Some scholars argue that empires also overstretch their resources by fighting expensive wars far from home, contributing to their own demise.
In recent centuries, the largest great-power wars have been won by ocean-going, trading nations whose economic style differs sharply from that of land-based empires. Rather than administer conquered territories, these "hegemons" allow nations to control their own economies and to trade fairly freely with each other. This free trade ultimately benefitted hegemons as advanced producers who sought worldwide export markets. The Netherlands after the Thirty Years' War (1648), Britain after the Napoleonic Wars (1815), and the United States after the World Wars (1945) each enjoyed predominance in world trade. By virtue of superior naval military power, each of these great powers shaped (and to some extent enforced) the rules and norms for the international economy. For example, the international financial institutions of the Bretton Woods system grew out of U. S. predominance after World War II. As nations recover in the decades following a great war, however, their power tends to equalize, so a hegemon's raw power gradually matters less, and international economic institutions tend to become more independent - surviving because they offer mutual benefits and help resolve collective goods dilemmas. For example, the United States today, despite its military predominance, does not unilaterally control the World Trade Organization.
Naval power has been used historically to win specific trading and extraction rights, in addition to its broader uses in establishing global economic orders. When asked the reasons for declaring war on the Dutch, a 17 th - century English general replied, "What matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade the Dutch now have." U. S. warships in the 19 th century forced open Japan's closed economy. And in the mid-1990s, both Canada and Russia used warships to drive away foreign fishing boats from areas of the high seas that shared fish populations with Canadian and Russian exclusive economic zones as defined under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In recent decades, disputes over control of small islands - which now convey fishing and mining rights up to 200 miles in all directions, have led to military hostilities in the South China Sea and the Falklands/Malvinas, among others.
Military power has provided the basis for extracting tolls and tariffs on trade, in addition to its more direct role in conquest of resources and trade routes. Danish cannons overlooking the Baltic Sound gave the Danes for centuries a stream of income from tolls on the Baltic trade. River-borne trade in Europe faced similar choke-points where strategic military fortifications allowed tolls to be charged. The military defeat of the Ottoman empire, by contrast, cost Turkey the ability to control or tax traffic from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, which today includes a large and growing number of oil tankers.
War and the World Economy.
Just as wars' costs and outcomes affect economic conditions and evolution, so too do economic conditions and evolution affect war. Causality runs in both directions. For example, Dutch economic strengths in the early 17 th century allowed rapid and cheap production of ships, including warships. The resulting naval military advantage in turn supported Dutch long-distance trade. The wealth derived from that trade, in turn, let the Netherlands pay and train a professional standing army, which successfully sheltered the Netherlands from the ruinous Thirty Years' War. This protection in turn let the Dutch expand their share of world trade at the expense of war-scarred rivals. Thus the evolution of warfare and of world economic history are intertwined.
War is the proximal cause of the recurring inflationary spikes that demarcate 50-year "Kondratieff waves" in the world economy. Those waves themselves continue to be controversial. However, they may have some predictive value to the extent they clarify the historical relationships between war and military spending on the one hand, and inflation and economic growth on the other. The 1990s mainly followed a predicted long-wave phase of sustained low inflation, renewed growth, and reduced great-power military conflict. If this pattern were to continue, the coming decade would see continued strong growth but new upward pressures on military spending and conflict, eventually leading to a new bout of inflation in the great-power economies. Since scholars do not agree on the mechanism or even the existence of long economic waves, however, such projections are of more academic than practical interest.
The relationship between military spending and economic growth has also generated controversy. Despite its pump-priming potential in specific circumstances, as during the 1930s, military spending generally acts to slow economic growth, since it diverts capital and labor from more productive investment (such as in roads, schools, or basic research). During the Cold War, high military spending contributed (among other causes) to the economic stagnation of the Soviet Union and the collapse of North Korea, whereas low military spending relative to GDP contributed to Japan's growth and innovation. During the 1990s, as real military spending worldwide fell by about one-third, the United States and others reaped a "peace dividend" in sustained expansion. However, effects of military spending are long-term, and sharp reductions do not bring quick relief, as Russia's experience since 1991 demonstrates.
The global North-South divide - a stark feature of the world economy - is exacerbated by war. The dozens of wars currently in progress worldwide form an arc from the Andes through Africa to the Middle East and Caucasus, to South and Southeast Asia. In some of the world's poorest countries, such as Sudan and Afghanistan, endemic warfare impedes economic development and produces grinding poverty, which in turn intensifies conflicts and fuels warfare.
The role of war in the world economy is complex, yet pervasive. The shadow of war lies across economic history, influencing its pace and direction, and war continues to both shape economic developments and respond to them.
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Silberner, Edmund. The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought . Princeton, 1946. Survey of economists' efforts to tackle the economic effects and causes of war. See also Silberner's La Guerre Dans la Pensee Economique du XVIe au XVIIIe Siecle . Paris, 1939.
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